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INTRODUCTION 
D e s p i t e  t h e  m o u n t i n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t 
understanding and addressing the concerns 
of external stakeholders such as government 
offi  cials, regulators, communities and NGOs is a 
critical driver of strategic success for companies, 
particularly in emerging markets, there remains 
a widely held perception that such ef for ts 
constitute a giveaway of hard-earned returns that 
management will come to regret in the future. 
These operationally- or fi nancially-minded critics 
view the “tree-huggers” sitting together in the 
executive dining room as temporary invaders on 
their terrain whose influence the company will 
soon regret. They view the CEO’s commitments 
at Davos and other international events to be 
unfunded liabilities.
The voice of such critics strengthens during 
periods of cost pressure or intense competition 
w h e n m a n a g e r i a l  at te nt i o n is  fo c u s e d o n 
cost ef f ic iencies and potential  low-impact 
redundancies. In recent years, as the price 
of minerals and oil and gas have plummeted, 
investments in stakeholder relations previously 
argued to be essential to generate value from 
risky deposits and fi elds have been slashed. Staff  
in government affairs, community affairs and 
sustainability have borne far more than their share 
of cutbacks.  
A common pattern emerges in which managers 
begin with an overly optimistic forecast for a new 
investment that ignores the full range of concerns 
of and potential costs associated with external 
stakeholders. The investment is approved and the 
true nature of reality is slowly realized. Additional 
costs will have to be borne, additional concessions 
made to external stakeholders and the pace of 
investment will have to slow. Often, the revised 
returns remain profitable and the company’s 
revised strategy includes many of the elements 
of corporate diplomacy. However, when prices 
come under pressure and, especially, when a 
This article aims to demonstrate how 
social, political and environmental risk 
management can be integrated into a 
fi nancial framework. To do so, corporate 
diplomats must use the same tools 
and performance indicators that their 
counterparts in operations, marketing or 
fi nance use. The fi nancial valuation, both in 
terms of avoided cost and net value added 
by acceptability strategies appears to be 
a necessary condition to have them leave 




Assessing the success of 
the acceptability approaches 
new leadership team arrives, these investments and changes in 
plan are viewed with scepticism. They are compared explicitly or 
subconsciously to the original plan which promised far greater 
returns with lower up-front costs. No matter that the original 
plan was naïve in its assumptions and impossible to realize on the 
stakeholder landscape that existed in reality. New managers want to 
prove themselves to be adept at the turnaround and to right the ship 
that has strayed off  course and must be seen to do so quickly. They 
slash the add-on investments and headcount of staff  in the corporate 
diplomacy functions. In so doing, they reduce the long-term value of 
the asset but show a short-term improvement in the fi nancial balance 
sheet. By the time the true costs of their short-sighted management 
strategy is revealed, they have likely moved on to their next position.
It is absolutely critical to guard against such short-term pathos that 
corporate diplomats be able to prove the net present value of their 
investments. It is not enough to tell stories or point to historic write-
offs. They need to be able to calculate using the same tools, key 
performance indicators and fi nancial models that their counterparts 
in operations, marketing and fi nance use that their investments are 
not “nice to haves” but are core to the long-term value of the asset.
1. THE NEED FOR CORPORATE DIPLOMATS 
TO EMBRACE THE DOMINANT LOGICS 
OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS
In order to survive business downturns, the corporate diplomat must 
successfully integrate their insights and value proposition into the 
dominant systems and logic that drive business decision-making. They 
must abandon hopes of transforming or supplementing the existing 
systems or convincing their peers of the virtues of corporate diplomacy 
as an end in and of itself. Instead they must accept the dominant logics of 
their organizations and embed corporate diplomacy within them.
1.1. THE USE OF DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF)
Put simply, to win workplace arguments involving the allocation of scarce 
funds for material investments and payroll, you must quantify your 
evidence in terms of the return on those investments. Companies use 
discounted cash fl ow (DCF) analyses to evaluate potential investments, 
consumer surveys to assess new products and click-through studies 
to track online ad campaigns. Stories matter too — we humans are 
storytellers and make sense of the world by shaping facts into narratives. 
But stories alone will not convince colleagues — unless those stories are 
supported by numbers. 
Corporate diplomats too often ignore numbers. They assume that 
moral appeals or dire prophecies will sway colleagues. Those can help. 
Companies care about right and wrong, and we all learn from mistakes. 
But those alone will not beat spreadsheets, and they will not build 
company wide support for stakeholder engagement, especially in times 
of tight budgets. In an influential review of Newmont Mining’s social 
responsibility practices, law fi rm Foley Hoag wrote that engagement is 
still seen as “voodoo” by professionals from other fi elds1. Marketing and 
human resources departments have embraced the tools of the social 
1  See G.A. Smith and D. Feldman, Newmont Community Relationships Review (Washington, DC: Foley 
Hoag LLP, 2009; www.beyondthemine.com/pdf/CRRGlobalSummaryFULL-EnglishFINAL.pdf, accessed 
December 10, 2013).
sciences to improve the precision of their analyses and 
to make their cases more convincing to colleagues. 
Corporate diplomats must follow, quantifying costs 
and benefi ts and providing credible estimates of how 
their programs can yield fi nancial returns. 
A DCF analysis is the standard way of making that 
sort of estimate. The term may seem forbidding, but 
anyone who can plug numbers into a spreadsheet and 
understand what those numbers mean can learn to 
do a DCF analysis. A day-long seminar will teach the 
basics. As a bonus, you will learn that the estimates 
emanating from the finance department are not as 
precise as they seem; the final number, positive or 
negative, depends partly on the assumptions. One 
of the key assumptions is where you draw the line on 
counting costs and benefits. It is simpler to look at 
direct short-term costs and benefi ts, and short-term 
estimates are typically more accurate.
In the construction industry, advocates of investing 
in energy conserving design and materials were 
originally stymied by a convention to focus the DCF 
analysis only on the period of construction and not on 
subsequent operation. Poorly insulated structures will 
typically be cheaper to build, but, on account of the 
greater need for air conditioning and heating, more 
costly to operate. Until the convention shifted from 
pricing buildings based on their lifetime operating 
costs, the green building movement struggled to 
go beyond principled rhetoric, while study after 
study showed that customers were choosing poor 
designs. The introduction of life-cycle cost accounting 
transformed practice, not because it changed the 
facts but because it empowered key decision-makers 
in finance and accounting to take those facts into 
consideration.
A similar revolution is under way in addressing 
the environmental costs of production of goods 
and services. Companies such as furniture maker 
Herman Miller, IT services provider SAP, and retailer 
Walmart, have found that efforts to reduce waste and 
resource use yield high economic and social returns. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit 2 highlighted the 
successes of these companies and others: 
•  Forrester Research found that Herman Miller’s 
efforts to improve sustainability generated a 32% 
annual return on investment;
•  Walmart’s calculations revealed that a 5% reduction 
in packaging would translate into $11 billion of cost 
savings, of which it would capture $4.3 billion;
•  3M saved $1.7 billion through its pollution prevention 
pays (3Ps) program since it was introduced in 1975. 
The program seeks to prevent pollution upfront by 
reformulating products, manufacturing processes, 
redesigning equipment, and recycling and reusing 
waste from production;
2  Economist Intelligence Unit, Corporate Citizenship: Profi ting From Sustainable 
Business (London: The Economist, 2008).
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•  FedEx aims to convert its entire 35,000 vehicle 
fl eet to electric or hybrid engines. To date 20% have 
been converted, which has already reduced fuel 
consumption by over 50 million gallons;
•  Procter & Gamble seeks to create an estimated 
$20 billion new product line in detergents that are 
effective in cold water.
C o r p o ra te d i p l o m a t s m u s t  e m b ra c e t h e D C F 
analyses that many of them have long decried for 
not incorporating the true costs and consequences 
of short-term business decisions. But their DCF 
analyses will encompass not only longer (and thus 
more realistic) periods, but also secondary costs 
and benefits related to the stakeholders they have 
long championed. Sceptics will always argue that it is 
cheaper to ignore community complaints. They can 
do this successfully only if the data available shows 
short-term costs and ignores long-term benefi ts. Imagine a similar debate 
ten years ago at Walmart about reducing packaging or at FedEx about 
reducing fuel. Progress requires that someone makes a business case 
using the same tools and models that went into decisions to purchase 
computers, buy planes or build warehouses. Once corporate diplomats 
can calculate the likelihood of continued confrontation with stakeholders, 
and the costs and lost opportunities that confrontation brings, costs and 
benefi ts will look very different. 
1.2. JENSEN’S WORK: INTEGRATING STAKEHOLDER COSTS AND 
BENEFITS INTO TRADITIONAL DCF MODELS
They can then break down the barrier between those who emphasize 
shareholders and those who stress stakeholders. One of the academics 
who has done the most to champion a shareholder focus within 
corporations is Michael Jensen of Harvard Business. Yet in a 2002 
paper 3, Jensen said: “We cannot maximize the long-term value of an 
organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency. We 
cannot create value without good relations with customers, employees, 
financial backers, suppliers, regulators and communities.” He argued, 
though, that without means to translate the costs of mistreatment 
into firm value, stakeholder theory fails to give concrete guidance to 
managers. Instead, he proposed “enlightened value maximization” 
as a decision-making criterion, and argued that it was identical to an 
“enlightened stakeholder theory.” Jensen said that managers should 
“spend an additional dollar on any constituency provided the long-term 
value added to the firm from such expenditure is a dollar or more”. In 
essence, the challenge that Jensen presented to corporate diplomats 
is how to incorporate stakeholder costs and benefi ts into the traditional 
DCF models, which omit them.
3  M. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function,” Business 
Ethics Quarterly 12 (2, 2002): 32-42.
“ONCE CORPORATE DIPLOMATS 
CAN CALCULATE THE LIKELIHOOD 
OF CONTINUED CONFRONTATION 
WITH STAKEHOLDERS, AND THE 
COSTS AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES 
THAT CONFRONTATION BRINGS, 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 




The IFC, in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Deloitte, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Authority (MIGA), Rio 
Tinto and Newmont Mining, has developed a freely available online net 
present value (NPV) project management tool that rises to the challenge 
posed by Jensen. It can be downloaded at www.fvtool.com4. 
2. MANY EXISTING STUDIES DEMONSTRATE 
THE POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Increasingly, company- or project-level evidence shows that numbers 
support the case for stakeholder engagement and that companies that 
ignore outside stakeholders do so at their peril. 
2.1. THE COST OF IGNORING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
A 2009 Goldman Sachs study5 examining the largest capital investment 
projects in the world highlighted that the time for new projects to be 
completed doubled between 1998 and 2008. More delays were caused by 
stakeholder and sustainability problems (70%) than commercial (63%) 
and technical (21%) ones. On average, the largest 230 projects in 2009 
were 20 months behind schedule and 135% over budget compared with 
the 2006 forecasts for these same projects. Work by Ed Merrow at the 
Independent Project Association comes to a similar conclusion. Projects 
that score best in what he calls “front end loading” (i.e., up-front defi nition 
of the project including the mechanisms to manage conflicts between 
stakeholders’ objectives and goals), come in on budget and on-time 
whereas those that score poorly are 26 months late to completion and 
over 50% over budget. A 2012 Accenture study6 of the projects in mining 
and metals likewise found that two-thirds were more than 25% over 
budget and that regulatory and stakeholder-related issues accounted for 
nearly half of the delays. 
Similarly, in a study7 with Sinziana Dorobantu and Lite Nartey, I found 
that, for the 19 publicly traded gold-mining companies, the amount by 
which investors discounted the cash fl ow projections of a mine was highly 
correlated with the degree of stakeholder conflict or cooperation. We 
were able to estimate DCFs for the 26 mines owned by these companies. 
If investors and analysts had ignored stakeholder opinions, then the 
market capitalization of these fi rms should have equaled the NPV of their 
future cash fl ows. 
What we found dif fered starkly. The average f irm had a market 
capitalization equal to only 22% of its DCF projections. In other words, 
when these companies told investors that they had discovered gold that 
would generate $1 billion of new value, investors increased the companies’ 
average market capitalization by only $220 million. Next, we coded over 
20,000 newspaper articles, which contained over 50,000 reports of 
stakeholder actions or statements that connoted confl ict or cooperation. 
We coded each of these stakeholder events on a conflict–cooperation 
scale and found that amount of the investor discount was strongly 
4  A similar approach is advocated by T. Bekefi  and M.J. Epstein “Integrating Social and Political Risk into 
Management Decision-Making” (Mississauga ON: The Society of Management Accountants of Canada & 
New York, NY: The American Institute of Certifi ed Public Accountants), 2006.
5  Goldman Sachs Group, 230 Projects to Change the World, 2009 (www.borsaitaliana.it/bitApp/view.bit?lan
g=it&target=StudiDownloadFree&fi lename=pdf%2F78052.pdf, accessed December 13, 2013).
6  See Accenture, Achieving Superior Delivery of Capital Projects: Accenture Global Survey of the Metals and 
Mining Industry, 2012 (www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-Capital-Projects-
Report-Metals-Mining.pdf, accessed December 10, 2013).
7  W.J. Henisz, S. Dorobantu and L. Nartey, “Spinning Gold: The Financial and Operational Returns to External 
Stakeholder Engagement,” Strategic Management Journal (in press 2014; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1002/smj.2180/abstract, accessed December 10, 2013).
correlated with our conflict–cooperation measure. 
When we adjusted the DCF projections using our 
measure as a proxy for higher costs or lower revenues, 
we found that the investor discount ranged from a high 
of 99% for fi rms with the worst stakeholder confl ict to 
as low as 13% for companies with the highest levels of 
stakeholder cooperation. This fi nding demonstrates 
that investors and analysts tracking a stock are 
monitoring the media and updating their estimates 
of cash flow, the opening dates of new mines, and 
company costs, based upon stakeholder actions 
covered in the press. The long-standing complaint by 
managers that investors do not pay attention to their 
efforts simply does not stand up. Our takeaway: any 
cash flow projection that does not incorporate the 
costs of stakeholder confl ict is as inadequate as one 
that omits commercial or technical risks.
While the magnitude of the returns to corporate 
diplomacy that we found in our sample of publicly 
traded small capitalization mining companies is 
certainly above the average available to most firms, 
other studies have corroborated the f inding of 
consistent positive returns. These include Eccles, 
Ioannou & Serafiem (2011) who found that a basket 
of leaders on environmental and social performance 
fi nancially outperform a basket of laggards by 4-6% per 
annum. Schnietz and Epstein (2005) and Albuquerque, 
Durnev and Koskinen (2014) show that firms with 
higher environmental and social performance are 
less susceptible to risk and crises with the latter study 
fi nding a reduction in β of up to 4%. 
As a result of these benefi ts on average and in crises, 
better performing firms have a 40-45 basis point 
advantage in costs of f inance (Schneider, 2011; 
Oikononmou, Brooks & Pavelin, 2011; Goss & Roberts, 
2011) and are more likely to receive an investment 
grade rating (Goss & Roberts, 2011). Consumers 
reward such companies with higher sales growth and 
price premiums (Haimueller & Hiscox, various) and 
higher retention rates (Du, Bhattacharya & Sen, 2011). 
Workers in these firms are more productive (Tonin 
& Vlassapoulos, 2014), less likely to quit (Vitaliano, 
2010), willing to work for a lower wage (Burbano, 
2014) and are more engaged in their jobs (Wong, 2011; 
Grant, various).
“OUR TAKEAWAY: ANY CASH FLOW 
PROJECTION THAT DOES NOT 
INCORPORATE THE COSTS OF 
STAKEHOLDER CONFLICT IS AS 
INADEQUATE AS ONE THAT OMITS 
COMMERCIAL OR TECHNICAL RISKS.”
Assessing the success of 
the acceptability approaches 
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2.2. INCREASING AWARENESS EVEN 
IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
In the fi nancial sector, where skepticism is relatively 
strong, the evidence of a posit ive association 
between environmental and social performance and 
financial performance continues to mount. Surveys 
of financial institutions reveal that as much as 10% 
of all credit losses involved environmental issues 
(Scholz et al., 1995). One German bank’s rollout of 
stronger Environmental Social Risk Management 
(ESRM) practices reduced error in risk classifi cation 
by 23% (Weber et al., 2010). Companies that receive 
credit from banks with stronger ESRM practices 
outperform peers on stock market (Aintblain, 2007). 
Environmental concerns are associated with a higher 
cost of debt fi nancing and lower credit ratings whereas 
proactive environmental practices are associated 
with a lower cost of debt (Bauer & Hann, 2010). Banks 
also face a large and growing number of lawsuits 
of financial institutions for environmental liabilities 
(Coulson & Dixon, 1995). 14% of all US commercial 
banks incurred clean-up costs on property held as 
collateral and 46% have suspended lending to certain 
sectors with high potential liabilities (Jeucken, 2001). 
As a result, f inancial institutions with stronger 
environment and social risk management practices 
are found to enjoy higher ROA and lower loan losses 
(Simpson & Kohers, 2002), higher ROA and growth 
in assets (Hu & Scholtens, 2012), faster growth and 
stronger performance in Lebanon (Elie, 2011) and 
India (Hossain & Reaz, 2007). Their ESRM practices 
service as a signal of quality to peers, lenders and 
investors (Schotlens & Dam, 2007) attracting less 
price sensitive customers (Matute-Vallejo et al., 2010) 
and helping them to gain market share and suffer 
fewer NGO attacks (Watchman, 2005) as well as 
higher yield spreads especially over longer maturities 
(Coleman et al., 2006).
T h e im p o r t a n c e of  Env iro n m e nt a l  a n d S o cia l 
Governance is now recognized and highlighted by 
the largest financial investors including Larry Fink, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Offi cer of BlackRock: 
“Investing in innovation and future production, 
developing talent and ensuring robust supply chains 
are among the many environmental, social and 
governance (ESG)- related management actions 
that enhance a company’s ability to generate long-
term financial returns. Businesses that fail to make 
suf f icient investments in the future can doom 
themselves to irrelevance.”
In 2015, BlackRock entered into a partnership with 
Ceres to develop a novel integrated approach to 
considering ESG factors as par t of a long-term 
investment strategy. Ceres President Mindy Lubber 
notes: “21st century companies and their shareholders 
are facing an increasing array of ESG challenges 
that can affect business and investment results. 
Climate change, water scarcity, community confl icts, 
resource depletion, supply chain breakdowns, 
worker well-being and economic inequality, coupled with instantaneous 
communication, can all present material risks and opportunities to 
businesses. Sustainability has become an imperative for successful 
corporations, and a variety of studies have shown that companies with 
strong sustainability cultures outperform their laggard peers. The 
business case for integrating ESG issues into mainstream investment 
practices has never been stronger. More than ever, investors are actively 
engaging with their portfolio companies on ESG issues as part of their 
fi duciary duty and also to protect the long-term value of their assets.”
As a result of this collaboration, BlackRock seeks novel mechanisms to 
consider the strategic impact of ESG factors for long-term value: “We 
actively seek to integrate environmental, social and corporate governance 
issues into our investment process. We believe that ESG factors are 
often a signal of management quality, particularly over the long term. 
The CGRI team partners closely with colleagues in BlackRock portfolio 
management to help raise awareness of potential risks, such as exposure 
to companies that are more likely to face litigation or reputational harm 
as a result of poor management of the impact of their operations on the 
environment or society.”
BlackRock is not alone. According to a PRI survey, while 57% of CEOs 
believe that their sustainability reports set out the business case for 
environmental and social governance and 38% believe they quantify 
the returns to these investments and 47% recall discussing them on 
quarterly earnings calls, the investors covering these fi rms have a very 
different perception. Only 9% are satisfi ed with current reports’ ability 
to set out a business case. Only 7% believe that business case includes 
a quantifi cation of returns and only 27% recall the senior management 
discussing these topics on quarterly earnings calls. 82% want better 
information from companies on how environmental and social risks are 
identifi ed and quantifi ed in fi nancial terms (PwC).
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3. CAPTURING THE BUSINESS VALUE 
OF SUSTAINABILITY
Hopefully, the pressure imposed by BlackRock and other investors in 
quarterly earnings calls to explore the link between ESG practices and 
long-term value will lead to a shift not only in company-level reporting 
but, more importantly, in management practices. The shift will take time 
and substantial effort. Gathering data needed for a specifi c DCF analysis 
is, of course, harder than talking about its importance or highlighting 
the benefi ts of doing it well. Doing so demands an upfront investment of 
scarce personnel time and requires support from bosses. 
3.1. STARTING WITH EASY-TO-QUANTIFY DATA
You do not have to do an exhaustive analysis on the fi rst attempt. Start 
small, gathering the easy-to-quantify data and feeding that into the early 
estimates. Build from there. A 2013 Accenture study 8 surveying CEOs on 
sustainability highlights the potential benefi ts of even simple approaches: 
63% of CEOs surveyed believed that sustainability would transform 
their industry within five years, and 76% believed that embedding 
sustainability into core business functions would drive revenue growth 
and new opportunities. But the CEOs also reported that they struggled 
to “quantify and capture the business value of sustainability.” 37% of 
them reported that this lack of a clear link to business value was hindering 
further action. 
3.2. EXAMPLES OF MAIN RELEVANT DATA
Among the readily quantifi able costs that one will want to include are:
•  Direct costs, including staffi ng, capital investments and raw materials both 
initially and over a project’s life
• Overheads or other hidden indirect costs
One should also consider the less obvious cost reductions and revenue 
enhancements that a project might generate. Possibilities are:
• Revenue lost (gained) due to: 
- Lower (higher) consumer willingness to pay
- Production stoppages or delays (accelerations in the timeline)
-  Ease of entry into markets due to new government regulations or 
policies that respond to opponents’ (supporters’) pressures
• Staffi ng expenses, including:
- Managers to oversee engagements after a confl ict
-  Engineers to redesign controversial plans and government affairs or 
regulatory staff to repermit after redesign
- Guards to protect personnel and property when tempers fl are
-  Lawyers and lobbyists to provide representation in proceedings or 
investigations
-  Higher training and recruitment costs as well as retention costs at 
corporate sites that have seen confl icts
•  Insurance, risk management and compliance expenses, including fi nes 
and penalties
•  Depreciation for property, plant and equipment (PP&E) that goes obsolete 
during delays and repairs for PP&E damaged during confl icts
• Higher PR expenses stemming from particular disputes
8  Accenture, The UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability 2013: Architects of a Better 
World (www.accenture.com/Microsites/ungc-ceo-study/Documents/pdf/13-1739_UNGC%20report_
Final_FSC3.pdf, accessed December 10, 2013).
CONCLUSION 
The real benefits to this process for companies, 
however, will not be in merely calculating a return 
on investment or satisfying the demands of 
external investors. Certainly, those are important 
short-term goals. What happens next within the 
company will be far more important. Quantifying 
financial benefits helps to show how intelligent 
measurement and tracking can improve the 
ef fectivene s s of  enga gement and how the 
benefits of diplomacy flow to the bottom line. 
This transforms the dialogue about corporate 
diplomacy from one in which sceptics demand a 
justification for current costs to one in which they 
work with corporate diplomats to jointly identify 
new opportunities to create value. 
It transforms the management of corporate 
diplomacy from a peripheral “nice to have” to 
a core strategic concern of the entire senior 
management team. Showing colleagues that 
corporate diplomacy can create financial value 
will turn some sceptics into evangelists, who 
return to their departments and lobby on behalf 
of corporate diplomacy. Their employees, in 
turn, begin to explore for shifts in management 
p r a c t i c e s  o r  s t r a t e g i e s  o r  e n t i r e l y  n e w 
practices that address the concerns of external 
stakeholders and deliver shareholder value. 
Suddenly, innovations emerge in operations, 
f inance or securit y as wel l  as government 
af fa irs ,  communic ations or sustainabi l i t y. 
The act of using a common model and toolkit 
c r e a te s  a n  a r te f a c t  a r o u n d  w h i c h  c r o s s-
functional collaboration and problem solving 
can readily mobilize. The act of calculating the 
“net present value” finally allows the discussion 
to get beyond whether the net present value is 
positive or negative and onto the collaborative 
exercise of pursuing enlightened self-interest for 
shareholders and stakeholders alike.
Many corporate diplomacy initiatives become easy to 
justify once their direct benefi ts and costs have been 
accurately measured and tracked. With accurate 
data, they become analogous to the well-known cases 
where expenses incurred in reducing waste delivered 
quick paybacks through lower costs for supplies, 
packaging and disposal. Many more corporate 
diplomacy initiatives may generate positive returns 
once their indirect benefits are considered, though 
indirect benefi ts will always be diffi cult to pin down.
Assessing the success of 
the acceptability approaches 
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